Since its establishment, Social Security has become the financial linchpin of American retirement. Yet demographic trends—longer lifespans and declining birthrates—mean that this popular program now pays more in benefits than it collects in revenue. Without reforms, 83 million Americans will face an immediate benefit cut of 20 percent in 2034. How did we get here and what is the solution? In Fixing Social Security, R. Douglas Arnold explores the historical role that Social Security has played in American politics, why Congress has done nothing to fix its insolvency problem for three decades, and what legislators can do to save it.

What options do legislators have as the program nears the precipice? They can raise taxes, as they did in 1977, cut benefits, as they did in 1983, or reinvent the program, as they attempted in 2005. Unfortunately, every option would impose costs, and legislators are reluctant to act, fearing electoral retribution. Arnold investigates why politicians designed the system as they did and how between 1935 and 1983 they allocated—and reallocated—costs and benefits among workers, employers, and beneficiaries. He also examines public support for the program, and why Democratic and Republican representatives, once political allies in expanding Social Security, have become so deeply polarized about fixing it.

As Social Security edges closer to crisis, Fixing Social Security offers a comprehensive analysis of the political fault lines and a fresh look at what can be done—before it is too late.

This book is the first large-scale examination of how local media outlets cover members of the United States Congress. Douglas Arnold asks: do local newspapers provide the information citizens need in order to hold representatives accountable for their actions in office? In contrast with previous studies, which largely focused on the campaign period, he tests various hypotheses about the causes and consequences of media coverage by exploring coverage during an entire congressional session.

Using three samples of local newspapers from across the country, Arnold analyzes all coverage over a two-year period--every news story, editorial, opinion column, letter, and list. First he investigates how twenty-five newspapers covered twenty-five local representatives; and next, how competing newspapers in six cities covered their corresponding legislators. Examination of an even larger sample, sixty-seven newspapers and 187 representatives, shows why some newspapers cover legislators more thoroughly than do other papers. Arnold then links the coverage data with a large public opinion survey to show that the volume of coverage affects citizens' awareness of representatives and challengers.

The results show enormous variation in coverage. Some newspapers cover legislators frequently, thoroughly, and accessibly. Others--some of them famous for their national coverage--largely ignore local representatives. The analysis also confirms that only those incumbents or challengers in the most competitive races, and those who command huge sums of money, receive extensive coverage.

Two types of changes to Social Security have been proposed. One would keep the current defined-benefit structure but build and maintain a larger trust fund, to be partially invested in stocks and corporate bonds. The other would set up individual funded accounts, also to be partially invested in private markets. Both would raise taxes or lower benefits in the near term to increase funds for paying future benefits.This study addresses many important aspects of these politically charged proposals. The questions discussed include: Should Social Security have more advance funding? Should Social Security funds be invested in the stock market? If investments are organized by the government, what independent institutions would shield portfolio decisions and corporate governance from political pressures? If investments are privately organized, what would be the regulatory structure? Finally, should Social Security include individual defined-contribution accounts or stay with traditional defined benefits?The National Academy of Social Insurance is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose mission is to conduct research on and enhance public understanding of social insurance, to develop new leaders, and to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on issues related to social insurance.

In his 1998 State of the Union address, President Clinton challenged Americans to a public debate about how to fix the long-term financial problems of Social Security. This annual volume of the National Academy of Social Insurance provides a framework for that debate. Competing reform proposals reflect contrasting views about the nature of the Social Security problem and how to solve it. This book examines issues about privatization, national savings and economic growth, the political risks and realities in reforms, lessons from private pensions developments in the United States, and the efforts of other advanced industrial countries to adapt their old-age pensions to an aging population. It also poses philosophical arguments about collective versus individual responsibility and the implications of market risks and political risks for stable and secure retirement income policy. The contributors are Theo Angelis, Michael J. Boskin, Peter A. Diamond, John Geanakoplos, Hugh Heclo, Karen C. Holden, Howell Jackson, Olivia Mitchell, Dallas L. Salisbury, Lawrence H. Thompson, Kent Weaver, and Stephen P. Zeldes. Copublished with the National Academy of Social Insurance.

Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups of localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this important and original book, R. Douglas Arnold offers a theory that explains not only why special interests frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. By showing how legislative leaders build coalitions for both types of programs, he illuminates recent legislative decisions in such areas as economic, tax, and energy policy.

Arnold's theory of policy making rests on a reinterpretation of the relationship between legislators' actions and their constituents' policy preferences. Most scholars explore the impact the citizens' existing policy preferences have on legislators' decisions. They ignore citizens who have no opinions because they assume that uninformed citizens cannot possibly affect legislators' choices. Arnold examines the influence of citizens' potential preference, however, and argues that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems. He shows how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens. He then analyzes how coalition leaders manipulate the legislative situation in order to make it attractive for legislators to support a general interest bill.

Winner of the Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Prize, American Political Science Association, 1991.

How much influence do congressmen and bureaucrats have over each other's policy decisions? Douglas Arnold offers a partial answer in this book, which focuses on the efforts of congressmen to influence bureaucrats' decisions concerning the geographic allocation of federal expenditures.

Obviously congressmen benefit when bureaucrats allocate federal projects to their districts, and bureaucrats benefit when congressmen support their programs.  They can, in effect, trade with each other.  Arnold develops a theory to explain the circumstances under which they choose to trade, taking into account their different propensities to trade, variations in their resources, and differences among policies.  He then tests the theory against extensive evidence from agency files, analyzing over eight thousand bureaucratic decisions related especially to the selection of model cities, the acceptance of applications for water and sewer grants, the construction of new military installations, and the closing of existing military facilities.  The evidence supports both the theory as a whole and the notion that bureaucrats carefully tailor their allocational strategies to fit each program's situation in Congress.